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The practice and politics of leaking

Kathryn Flynn

Abstract

Civic-minded people who encounter what they believe to be corrupt and illegal
conduct in the workplace may take it upon themselves to release relevant
confidential information. This is done either through an open disclosure,
where the identity of the whistleblower is publicly known, or an unauthorised
disclosure where the identity of the leaker is not revealed. This information is
typically leaked to journalists or activists who may be able to seek redress.
Leaking is an alternative to whistleblowing and carries fewer risks of reprisals
but leakers need to be alert to pitfalls with this practice.

Introduction
In a democracy people need access to information on political, social and
economic issues in order to judge whether their elected officials are acting in
the public interest. However, too often their elected officials evade such
scrutiny and fraud and abuse goes unchecked. Most people with access to
relevant information are deterred from leaking or whistleblowing due to
legislative prohibitions. They may be those embodied in official secrets acts or
the case of the United States the Espionage Act (1917). The Official Secrets Act
covers legislation providing for the protection of state secrets and official
information and is used in the United Kingdom, India, Ireland and Malaysia.
Australia does not have an Official Secrets Act but has provisions under Part
VII of the Crimes Act (1914) restricting Commonwealth public servants from
revealing confidential information. The U.S. Espionage Act has a more limited
application. This Act only applies to the prohibition on the disclosure of
government information on defence issues. While governments have aimed to
keep official secrets confidential public servants with access to this material
have been successful in releasing it to the public either through the press or in
recent times passing it to WikiLeaks, a website for newsworthy leaks.
To draw a distinction between whistleblowing and leaking, whistleblowers are
overt in their disclosure of organisational deviance, but there is a price.
Bureaucracies now know where their opposition is coming from, and can
isolate the whistleblowers by discrediting them, not giving them access to
further information and suspending them from work. Generally leakers don’t
suffer these reprisals.
The definition of leaking is blurred; it can mean an unauthorised source giving
information to a journalist but it can also involve an authorised source with
political power and high status using the media to their advantage with little
likelihood of being prosecuted (Tiffen 1989: 97). In both instances leakers are
covert in their disclosure of information. The types of leaker discussed in this
article are workers in the public sector who without authorisation convey

official information to recipients outside of government (Standing Committee
67). It is usually released to the media in the public interest and these leakers
lack positions of high status and power. The information they provide
journalists has not been processed by official channels and there is an
undertaking by the journalist that the identity of the source will not be
revealed. This practice provides some measure of protection to the leaker.
Journalists are the usual recipients of leaked information but on occasion
information is leaked to activists who can act as a spur to additional media
coverage of the story (Martin 2009 206-216). There can be a range of motives
for leaking not all of them altruistic. Some leaks are vexatious in nature and
not in the public interest. The protection for journalists lies in checking the
information with many sources and gauging their reliability (Flynn 2006 264265).
The examples of leaking discussed in this paper are mainly Australian ones
but the issue is applicable to many other countries. Leaks can come from a
range of organisations; they may be governments, not-for-profit groups,
corporations, environmental groups, trade unions as well as churches. This
paper also mainly focuses on leaks from governments.
Not surprisingly governments and unions will not protect leakers if they are
caught even when they are acting in the public interest. But there are
divergent meanings of the phrase ‘the public interest’. Journalists and leakers
define it as information that brings accountability and transparency to
government and exposes maladministration or corruption. Governments
argue that they are the interpreters of the public interest and that public
servants are be bound by rules of confidentiality and are not free to speak out
on malfeasance. As Peter Shergold, Secretary of the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet in the Australian government explained, leaking by
public servants is ‘not just a criminal offence but also democratic sabotage’
(Shergold 2004). Supporting this view the then National Secretary of the
Community and Public Sector Union, Stephen Jones, giving evidence to the
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional

Affairs in its report on whistleblowing protection, held that leaking should not
be protected due to its harmful impact on the relationship between the
executive and the public service. Presenting a different perspective to this
committee was Peter Bennett, president of Whistleblowers Australia. He
argued that the official responses to people who leak confidential information
are outrageous and that leakers should be protected from civil and criminal
liability (Standing Committee 2009 67).
The practice of leaking
One of the difficulties for a public servant who sees evidence of what they
perceive is an organisation’s corrupt practice and believes that neither
management nor parliament will do anything about the problem, is deciding
what to do next. They may be influenced by the rhetoric of senior bureaucrats
who assert that leaking undermines the trust between the executive and the
public service. This might seem a compelling argument except it hides the
need for information to be freely available so there is effective decisionmaking.

•

If a leaker decides to speak to a journalist, they must first decide which
media outlet is most suitable for publicising the story, whether it is a
national or local outlet and what the outlet’s editorial policy on the issue is.
In selecting a reporter it is recommended to approach one who is
experienced and has a reputation for maintaining confidentiality.

•

Leakers need to understand the importance of the timing of the release of
documents.

•

A leaker needs to be armed with documents in order to be believed by a
journalist, unless he or she is an experienced and reliable source.

•

In addition knowledgeable leakers advise briefing the journalist with a
clear and compelling one page summary of the key issues of the case.

•

The biggest problem with passing documents across to the media is that
photocopiers tend to leave a signature on the copied document, which
could be dust or the electronic idiosyncrasies of the machine. So the best

way to photocopy the document/s is to use a photocopier in an offsite
facility, for example, in a newsagency, library or internet cafe. When the
journalist receives the document request him or her to re-photocopy the
document and shred the document they had received (which is not the
original). It is best to avoid using departmental photocopiers, fax
machines, computers, email or telephones (The Art of Anonymous
Activism 2002).
•

The print media are preferable to television as print is better able to ensure
the leaker’s anonymity. Television productions quite often need shadow
outs or use distorted voice – and the original voice sometimes can be
reconstructed. Television and radio will often do stories inspired by a print
story.

•

Some leakers, including WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, believe that
leaking is best undertaken by one person working alone who maintains
confidentiality. Again others derive safety from working in a group, with
information being streamed through a designated spokesperson. In this
way the journalist knows the identity of only one of the leakers. Others
believe that with group involvement the security of the operation is
compromised as someone in the group may drop their guard and talk
openly about the leaked information.

•

Leaking is unpopular with managers for it is embarrassing and can
highlight workplace incompetence, inefficiency and secrecy. The leaker is
left in a strong position as his or her identity is hard to uncover and they
may be able to stay in the job and leak further information at some stage in
the future.

•

Reactions by staff members to leaks can be to find the source of the leak
and pass further additional information to this source so it gets into the
public arena.

•

If leakers are caught it can result in the same reprisals that whistleblowers
are subject to – demotion or loss of employment and in fact, to find the
leakers, managers may resort to targeting innocent people and attributing

them with the leak. This can have the desired effect of making the leaker
come forward with an admission of guilt.
•

There are risks in leaking. The identity of the leaker may be disclosed
during the course of a parliamentary inquiry or by accidental disclosure,
for example when a document is passed to a journalist by fax machine.

•

On the positive side leaking can influence government policy because it can
result in some aspects of public policy being examined more thoroughly
than they would in an environment where policy is not subject to such
scrutiny (Flynn 2006).

•

Further information on methods of leaking can be found in Nicky Hager
and Bob Burton’s book Secrets and Lies (Hager & Burton 1999), a booklet
The Art of Anonymous Activism (2002) and Julian Assange’s article, How
a Whistleblower Should Leak Information (Assange 2010).

Case study - Medibank
There are many instances where principled public servants have come forward
to disclose waste and fraud but one that I am familiar with concerns Medibank
– the precursor to Medicare – where whistleblowers and leakers disclosed
information to the media, and the Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA)
of fraud and abuse against Medibank.
Medibank was a system of publically funded universal health care that was
introduced in Australia in 1975. It enjoyed great electoral popularity but there
was a defect with the scheme. It had no legislative architecture to control
fraud and overservicing, and with few systems in place and inadequate
staffing, the Department of Health was left to manage the situation as best it
could.
Medibank’s first fraud investigator and first whisleblower was Joe Shaw. In
1978 he estimated $100m was being lost to fraud and overservicing and wrote
a report outlining his concerns. He was not listened to and he resigned. Some
months later, he gave it to a journalist working for Brisbane’s Courier Mail

newspaper. The article was a page one story. Two days later Senator Mal
Colston asked that Shaw’s report be tabled in parliament. This request was
refused. Four years later, committee members of the JCPA recognised the
value of Shaw’s report. This made it more difficult for senior management in
the Department of Health to deny knowledge of the problem.
The second whistleblower was John Kelly, Director of the Operations Branch
of the Commonwealth Department of Health. He had been asked by a senior
officer of the Department of Health to provide a departmental briefing for the
Minister. Kelly’s estimate of the amount lost through leakage to the system
was the same as Joe Shaw’s estimate. Kelly was aware that this information
was likely to be deleted by senior management, so using a strategy that was
procedurally correct; he hid the estimate in a complicated statistical appendix
in an attachment to the brief to the Minister. A senior officer in the
Department of Health reading Kelly’s report did not grasp the significance of
the statistical data and the report was forwarded to the Minister. This figure
was then sent to the Australian Medical Association (AMA) who accepted the
figure as the amount lost through fraud and overservicing.
It was to be the actions of whistleblowers, leakers, the media, the AMA and the
Auditor-General’s office in 1981 that led the JCPA to undertake an inquiry into
abuse of the Medical Benefits Schedule by medical practitioners.
A freelance journalist, Katherine Beauchamp, was employed by the JCPA from
February to September 1982 to prepare questions for the committee. She
interviewed whistleblowers, unauthorized confidential sources and high
ranking officials. However, her use of material from leakers raised the ire of
the Committee and she was suspended from her employment.
The Chairman of the Committee, David Connolly, had received leaked
information that either the Victorian division of the Commonwealth
Department of Health, or individual staff members of that office, had
facilitated criminal fraud by some doctors (JCPA Report 203, 1982 48).

Connolly subpoenaed forty-one files from the Commonwealth Department of
Health’s Melbourne office relating to this matter. On the first day of the
Committee’s hearings it was announced that there would be no discussion of
the forty-one files (JCPA vol. 1, 1 July 1982 303) as the citing of the names of
doctors could prejudice police investigation of the trials of those mentioned in
the files.
A confidential unauthorised source leaked the police report of the files to
Michael Smith, an investigative journalist with Melbourne’s The Age
newspaper, who wrote the story under the headline ‘Medifraud Cover-Up
Suspected’. On 13 September 1982 there were further revelations. The story
‘Medifraud: A Tale of Political Failure’ was compiled from leaked government
documents and other sources and helped put pressure on the government to
complete an interim report earlier than expected. Its publication in December
1982 contained forty-five recommendations and it validated the stance taken
by whistleblowers and leakers for government action on medical fraud and
overservicing.
In this case study the leaker/s were successful in passing over information to
the media in ways that protected their anonymity. Whoever the culprit/s were
they were not caught, discredited or suspended from work. They were able to
maintain the secrecy of their covert manoeuvre to get information to the
media and bypass official channels. The leaker/s took documentary evidence
to an experienced journalist who investigated the claims of the leaker/s,
collected further evidence and wrote newspaper articles on the topic. The
timing of the release of the documents was fortuitous. The editor of the
newspaper was interested in white collar crime, the health debate and exposés
of policy failures of the Fraser government. This was a government already
weakened by scandals and leakers and whistleblowers were emboldened to
make disclosures that would be effective (Flynn 2004 218).
The bigger picture

Leakers and whistleblowers acted in concert and fought for media and
parliamentary oversight of fraud and abuse against Medibank. These acts
come under the umbrella of what political theorist, John Keane, called
‘monitory democracy’. This was a new form of democracy born in the post
world war two period which saw the emergence of communicative
technologies – the photocopier, the scanner, the fax machine and later the
Internet, mobile phones and video recorders. It enabled citizens to more
effectively monitor the actions of government and with the help of the media
tell others about matters that have been covered up (Keane 2009). Peter
Shergold’s admonition that leaking was ‘democratic sabotage’ is at odds with
monitory democracy: the corrective to unnecessary secrecy and unaccountable
power.
One influential monitor on democracy was Daniel Ellsberg, an employee of the
Rand Corporation and an advisor to the Pentagon in the 1960s. Initially he
was a supporter of the war in Vietnam but in the course of his employment he
uncovered evidence that the Johnson administration had lied about its
involvement in the war. Ellsberg decided to take action. He photocopied the
evidence of the government’s deception, a hefty 7,000 page set of documents
called the Pentagon Papers and leaked this information to The New York
Times in 1971 (Ellsberg 2002). There were long legal delays before the Times
started to publish the documents. The government issued injunctions to
prevent publication of any other papers in the series. The matter ended up in
the Supreme Court which ruled against the injunctions and this generated
adverse publicity for the government.
When asked whether he would have used this approach today Ellsberg replied
that to avoid the legal delays he would have scanned the documents onto the
Internet. Julian Assange, argued that for someone in Ellsberg’s position it
would be better to go to a mainstream outlet to get maximum publicity but use
WikiLeaks for the storage of the documents. This has the advantage, Assange
told The New York Times, that the material can be verified in the same way
that an academic paper can be verified.

Learning more
Much has changed since the inception of newspaper investigative journalism.
In 2006 WikiLeaks was developed as a safe house for newsworthy leaks which
are of political, historic or ethical significance. The site is located on servers in
Sweden, Belgium and the United States. It maintains its own servers, keeps no
logs and uses military grade encryption to protect sources and other
confidential information. To date they have not released a misattributed
document.
The website has had significant successes. These include the release of the
Afghan War Logs, the Iraqi War Logs and US embassy diplomatic cables. The
mainstream media picked up these stories on WikiLeaks and the level of
publicity, which ensued, encouraged other leaking activists to send material to
this site. The retaliatory action taken by the US government was to imprison
the alleged leaker Bradley Manning.
Most unauthorised leakers do not meet such a fate. In fact they are successful
in reaching their goals. They may be to get information via the media into the
public arena, or to expose government policy to wider and more rigorous
community debate. Some want to drive a wedge between the executive and the
parliament by setting a doubt in the mind of politicians that they are not being
well briefed by senior officers of their departments through the omission or
cover-up of information. For others it is to achieve more substantial social or
political reform than any parliamentary inquiry can achieve.
Julian Assange has a different agenda and a bolder ambition. He is more
interested in societies being based on justice rather than on transparency and
openness, although these goals can converge. In essays written in 2006 he
explained his position. The goal is to “radically shift regime behaviour”. He
argued,

“We must understand the key generative structure of bad governance...we
must use these insights to inspire within us and others a course of
ennobling and effective action to replace the structures that lead to bad
governance with something better” (Assange 2006a).
He likens this bad governance to a conspiracy and by that he means the ability
of political elites to hold onto power through the secrecy of their plans and
actions which work to the detriment of the population. Conspiracies can be
undone by mass leaking. The idea is to increase the porousness of the
conspiracy’s information system so that the conspiracy will turn against itself
in self-defence. As the lines of communication are interrupted the information
flow decreases to the point where the conspiracy is not able to govern.
Where this bold ambition leads is yet to be seen but in the meantime whether
it is on WikiLeaks or in mainstream journalism leaking provides an alternative
to whistleblowing or just doing nothing in the face of corruption, fraud, waste,
abuse or hazards to the public. Leakers can be effective in redressing these
injustices but they need to be mindful of the precautions to be taken to protect
their anonymity.
I wish to thank Jørgen Johansen, Liam Phelan, Brian Martin, William de
Maria, Sandrine Therese, Lyn Carson, Colin Salter, Sharon Callaghan and Ian
Miles for helpful comments on the draft of this paper.
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